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In this paper, I investigate the issue of the contingency and inevitability of science. 
First, I point out valuable insights from the existing discussion about the issue. I then 
formulate a general framework, built on the notion of contrastive explanation and 
counterfactuals, that can be used to approach questions of contingency of science. 
I argue, with an example from the existing historiography of science, that this frame-
work could be useful to historians of science. Finally, I argue that this framework shows 
the existing views on historical contingency and counterfactuals in a new light. The 
framework also shows the value of existing historiography in philosophical debates.
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1 Introduction
Could science be different? In this paper, I investigate this issue. The debate 
between inevitabilists and contingentists concerns the question of whether 
science could be different from what it actually is, or if it is necessary that sci-
ence has the particular features that it in fact has. Inevitabilists argue that it 
is inevitable that science has certain features, while contingentists argue that 
science could have different features from what it in fact has. These are not 
mutually exclusive positions. Hardly anyone denies that some features of 
science are contingent (for example, the exact notations used). Yet it is also 
clear that there are cases where people have differing views on whether or not 
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certain features of science could be different from what they actually are. It is 
here that the debate is of philosophical and historical interest.
By focusing on the contingency of science, I do not mean to suggest that 
science is fundamentally different or independent from other human prac-
tices. Science may or may not be just like any other human activity. However, 
the nature of science is a question that can be answered only after historical 
and philosophical study. The issue of the contingency of science is one that 
can lead us to a better understanding of the relationship between science and 
other human activities. For this reason, I focus on the contingency of science 
in this paper. Moreover, one could argue that science is a special kind of ac-
tivity with respect to contingency. Such views cannot be dismissed without a 
closer look. For example, scientific realists could argue that scientific activi-
ties are limited by the way the world is.1 Science tracks the truth about mind- 
independent reality, and this fact sets very strict limits to the kind of science 
we can have.2 Thus, the realists could argue that science is much more restrict-
ed than human activities in general. On the other hand, the argument could be 
made that science is much less restricted than other human activities since sci-
ence is an elite culture that does not have to care about politics, economy, and 
the like. Perhaps both of these views are wrong and science is just as contin-
gent as any other human activity. However, before we can answer questions on 
the contingency of science, we need some tools to help us approach such ques-
tions. The development of those tools is the main task of this paper. Therefore, 
I focus on the contingency of science more as a methodological choice than as 
a statement about the special nature of science.
In this paper, I make three main arguments:
1. Science is a multidimensional global enterprise. Because of this, having a 
different science can mean many things. We must specify what we mean 
1   Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (Routledge, 1999) is an excellent 
introductory book to scientific realism.
2   The connections between scientific realism and the contingency of science is, of course, 
a much more complicated issue than suggested here. See: Léna Soler, Emiliano Trizio and 
Andrew Pickering, Science as It Could Have Been. Discussing the Contingency/Inevitability 
Problem (University of Pittsburgh Press 2015); Léna Soler, “Revealing the analytical struc-
ture and some intrinsic major difficulties of the contingentist/inevitabilist issue,” Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39:2 (2008), 230–241; Howard Sankey, “Scientific real-
ism and the inevitability of science,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39:2 
(2008), 259–264.
JPH_advance_Virmajoki.indd   2 14/02/2018   1:50:40 PM
3Could Science be Interestingly | DOI 10.1163/18722636-12341388
Journal of the Philosophy of History (2018) 1–22
by different science, and in what way this different science would be an 
interesting alternative to our actual science.
2. We can approach questions on the contingency of our actual science by 
using a framework built on the notion of contrastive explanations and 
counterfactual scenarios in the historiography of science.
3. The framework developed in this paper makes the issue of the contin-
gency of science relevant to a wide range of historians. The framework 
also helps us see how the existing historiographical studies can be rele-
vant to questions of contingency.
In the next section, I begin my investigation by briefly introducing the existing 
debate between contingentists and inevitabilists in the philosophy of science 
(in short: the C–I debate).3 However, it must be made clear that my task in this 
paper is not to argue for inevitabilism or contingentism, and that the principal 
aim of my framework is not to solve the C–I debate. The reason I introduce the 
C–I debate is because it has been a source of insight and inspiration for my 
investigation. From this debate, I have come to understand that
(i)  only some alternatives to the existing science would be relevant, and that
(ii)  historiographical studies play a fundamental role in answering questions 
of contingency. The debate is essential to understanding the framework I 
formulate.
Once we have gathered the most fruitful insights from the C–I debate, I then 
formulate a framework of contrastive explanations and define the concepts of 
contingency and inevitability within this framework. This framework
(i)  connects questions of contingency and inevitability directly to issues 
that are interesting,
(ii)  enables us to pinpoint historical events and processes on which the de-
gree of contingency of a given feature of science depends, and
(iii)  tells us what kind of (counterfactual) considerations are relevant in as-
sessing the degree of contingency of a given feature of science.
This framework does not make questions of contingency completely empiri-
cally soluble, but it nevertheless helps us find common ground between rival 
3   I use the term “C–I debate” to refer to this particular debate. See next section.
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views and clarify where they disagree. Thus, the framework is best understood 
as a philosophical tool.
Once this framework is in place, I demonstrate its application using 
Matthew Stanley’s study, “‘An Expedition to Heal the Wounds of War’: The 
1919 Eclipse and Eddington as Quaker Adventurer.”4 Given the information 
in Stanley’s paper, I ask how the contingency of observations of gravitational 
deflection can be approached. This example shows how asking contrastive 
questions enables us to use actual historiographical studies in the discussions 
on the contingency of science. However, it also shows that many questions 
remain open—some requiring further historical research, and others philo-
sophical reflection.
In the final sections, I point out how my framework relates to the existing 
discussions of contingency and counterfactuals in the philosophy of history. 
I show that there are interesting advantages if these issues are approached in 
the way suggested in this paper. I also point out why it is important that exist-
ing historiographical studies can be used to answer questions of contingencies, 
and in philosophy in general.
2 Insights from the C–I debate
Recently, there has been rich debate between inevitabilists and contingentists. 
In 2008, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science and Isis both devoted a 
special issue to this topic. In 2015, a book named Science as It Could Have Been: 
Discussing the Contingency/Inevitability Problem was published and included 
a variety of articles devoted to the theme. Of course, the debate had its begin-
nings much earlier, and can be found, for example, in Ian Hacking’s frequently 
cited paper “How inevitable are the results of successful science?”5
The debate is nuanced. Katherina Kinzel’s analysis can be used as a helpful 
guide to the complexities of the debate.6 However, the debate usually centers 
on the features of science that have traditionally been under discussion in phi-
losophy of science, such as theoretical commitments. As Joseph Rouse puts it:
4   Matthew Stanley, “’An Expedition to Heal the Wounds of War’: The 1919 Eclipse and Eddington 
as Quaker Adventurer,” Isis 94:1 (2003), 57–89.
5   Ian Hacking, “How inevitable are the results of successful science?” Philosophy of Science 67:3 
(2000), 58–71.
6   Katherina Kinzel, “State of the field: Are the results of science contingent or inevitable?” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52 (2015), 55–56.
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Does the emphasis on ontological commitments suggest that, despite all 
the talk about scientific practice, we philosophers still believe that the 
really important changes in science concern theoretical beliefs and on-
tological commitments? Or is the contingency issue itself a new way to 
reassert the philosophical primacy of theoretical commitments?7
Moreover, the question is usually about the possibility of a science that is fun-
damentally different from but equally successful as the actual science. Ian 
Hacking writes:
I asked: How inevitable are the results of successful science? Take any 
result R, which at present we take to be correct, of any successful science. 
We ask: If the results of a scientific investigation are correct, would any 
investigation of roughly the same subject matter, if successful, at least 
implicitly contain or imply the same results? If so, there is a significant 
sense in which the results are inevitable.8
Along similar lines, Léna Soler defines contingentism and inevitabilism as 
follows:
Contingentism:
(I)  more or less the same initial conditions obtain as those which have oc-
curred in the history of our own science;
(II)  nevertheless, the possibility, as ‘final’ (subsequent or later) conditions, at 
least in the long run, of an alternative physics,
(i) as successful and progressive as ours, and
(ii) which yields results irreducibly different from ours (notably which 
involves an ontology incompatible with ours).
Inevitabilism:
(I) if more or less the same initial conditions obtain as those which have oc-
curred in the history of our own science;
(II) and a successful and progressive physics has indeed been developed;
7   Joseph Rouse, “Laws, Scientific Practice, and the Contingency/Inevitability Question,” Science 
as It Could Have Been (2015), 321.
8   Hacking, “How inevitable are the results of successful science?” 61.
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(III) then, inevitably, as ‘final’ (subsequent or later) conditions, at least in the 
long run:
(i) more or less the same results and the same ontology as our own,
(ii) or different but reconcilable results and ontologies as our own.9
Soler’s definition helps us set aside the overly trivial and speculative defini-
tions of contingentism and inevitabilism. First, we may notice that it is trivially 
true that if human beings had never existed, there would be no science. It is 
also true that if human beings were very different from what they are, there 
would not be any science. For example, it could have been the case that human 
beings were only interested in drinking beer, and science as we know it would 
not exist. This case does not fit Soler’s definition.
Secondly, it is too easy to be an inevitabilist if one simply claims that in 
the end only one science will exist, and that no other science is possible. The 
characterization must specify what is meant by “the end”: Is it a situation in 
which no alternative considerations for the accepted science exist? If so, the 
debate will begin anew with the question of the possibility of such an end 
point. Perhaps the end could be seen as a situation where all our possible ma-
terial needs are satisfied. Then the inevitabilist claim would be that if there 
came a point where all our possible material needs were satisfied, then there 
would only be one accepted science, and thus no alternative science could be 
accepted without diminishing material welfare. This implies that there might 
be no end point in the development of science, and would thus make the in-
evitabilist position uninteresting. Thus, as Soler’s definition points out, inevi-
tabilists must minimally claim that there actually exist or will exist features of 
science that cannot be different from what they are, given that certain ante-
cedent conditions hold. The claim cannot be that science has or will have cer-
tain necessary features if a certain goal is achieved. Since the C–I debate is so 
closely connected to the idea of antecedent conditions, the history of science 
has an essential role to play in the debate.10
There are three main insights that I draw from the C–I debate. First, the 
debate must be about whether some antecedent conditions in history could 
9    Soler, “Revealing the analytical structure and some intrinsic major difficulties of the con-
tingentist/inevitabilist issue,” 233. (The formulation of the passage is slightly changed.).
10   See: Andrew Pickering, Constructing Quarks: A sociological history of particle physics 
(University of Chicago Press, 1984); James T. Cushing, Quantum Mechanics: Historical 
Contingency and the Copenhagen Hegemony (University of Chicago Press, 1994); Peter J. 
Bowler, Darwin Deleted. Imagining a World without Darwin (The University of Chicago 
Press, 2013); Soler et al. Science as It Could Have Been; and the papers in Isis 99:3.
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have led to a different science. Secondly, the history of science has an essential 
role in the debate. Thirdly, a discussion about the contingency of science can-
not proceed without an explication of what is meant by different science. In the 
C–I debate, different science usually means equally successful but fundamen-
tally different science. While this focus on the possibility of equally successful 
but fundamentally different science is understandable from the perspective of 
philosophy of science, this is where I leave the C–I debate behind and widen 
the scope of discussion on contingency in the history of science.
3 The Point of Departure
We already noted that Joseph Rouse ponders why theoretical commitments 
have been so central to the C–I debate. He also writes:
Grant that the instruments, experimental systems, and models with 
which scientific understanding is realized are more obviously contin-
gent. It does not follow from the mere recognition that abstract ontologi-
cal commitments are the only conceivable locus of scientific inevitability 
that such commitments are all that important.11
This seems correct to me, but we can go even further. There is an enormous va-
riety in the topics that historians of science are interested in. Some of them are 
interested in the relationship between science and religion in the past, others 
in the history of medical institutions. The list could go on and on. Historians do 
not only study what the past was like. They are also professionals in building 
pictures about alternative ways of life. Historians of science are well positioned 
to spot significant aspects of our current practices and describe interesting al-
ternatives to those practices—alternatives that would mean perhaps drastic 
changes in our lifestyle. Equal success is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
something to be an interesting alternative to science. It is not necessary be-
cause contexts of historical inquiry exist where an interesting alternative to 
our present science lacks some features that make our science so successful. 
Why is our present biology loaded with naturalistic explanations rather than 
religious ones? It would certainly be an interesting (although, arguably, not 
as successful) alternative to our present science if biology looked for religious 
explanations—an alternative that some quarters try to advance. On the other 
hand, equal success is not sufficient. For example, in a medical context there 
11   Rouse, “Laws, Scientific Practice, and the Contingency/ Inevitability Question,” 321–322.
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could be a hypothesis that is not an interesting alternative to an accepted one, 
since it would not suggest changes in the treatment of patients. Even if this 
alternative hypothesis would have been as successful as the accepted one, this 
does not guarantee that it is an interestingly different alternative12 to a histo-
rian who is interested in the treatments that are used. Moreover, the contin-
gency of features of science is a matter of degree. Even if everything besides 
theoretical commitments are obviously contingent, we can still ask how con-
tingent these features are. I now proceed to build a framework that can be used 
to approach the degrees of contingency of the variety of features that histori-
ans of science are interested in.
4 Counterfactuals, Explanation and Contingency
In this section, I argue that the best way to approach questions of contingency 
is to build counterfactual scenarios that would have led to an interestingly dif-
ferent science, and then evaluate the plausibility of these scenarios. In other 
words, we need to know what should have happened in the past in order for 
there to be some alternative to actual science, and only then evaluate how 
plausible or far-fetched that occurrence was. In the following, I develop the 
details of this approach.
In my earlier work,13 I defended the present-centered approach, also known 
as presentism, in the historiography of science. This approach has the follow-
ing structure:
1. By rational discussion, we isolate the significant features (F) of the pres-
ent science.
2. Next, we isolate such features F* that: if the present science had the fea-
ture F* in contrast to the actual feature F, the present science would be 
interestingly different from what it actually is.
3. The task of the historiography of science is to provide explanations of the 
form: had there been (in the past) an event14 Z, in contrast to the actual 
12   See the next section for what is meant by “interesting alternatives.”
13   Veli Virmajoki “Miten tieteenhistorian pitäisi valita tutkimuskohteensa?” [“How Should 
the Historiography of Science Choose its Targets of Study?”] Ajatus 72 (2015).
14   Usually, we must find a set of events that satisfies this condition. I will discuss the limiting 
case—only one event—to simplify matters.
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event Y, the present science would have the feature F* instead of F.15 In 
other words, the historiography of science provides explanations for sig-
nificant features of the present science.16
Using this approach, we can define the contingentist position as follows:
It could have been the case that science has the feature F* rather than 
the actual feature F, where the difference between F and F* is considered 
interesting in the given context of discussion.
We can accept that F* could have been the case if and only if (a) some-
one points out a counterfactual past event Z that would have led to F*, 
and (b) it is shown that the occurrence of Z in the past is not an impos-
sible (or extremely far-fetched) scenario.17
Moreover, the contingency of a certain feature F of science is a matter of degree:
Feature F can be judged to be (a) inevitable if and only if the occurrence 
of any Zi is seen as impossible and (b) a truly chancy feature if Z is a part 
of the actual history. Moreover, the more far-fetched the occurrence of Z 
is judged to be, the more inevitable feature F is.
For example, if it turns out that a theory that is actually held was chosen from 
among many theories by a flip of a coin, then the fact that we hold that par-
ticular theory instead of another is a chancy feature of science. On the other 
hand, the fact that we have theories of celestial motion lies at the other end of 
the continuum of contingency. Only in the far-fetched scenarios where human 
beings were not interested in repeating patterns of time (the understanding of 
which is necessary for agriculture) there would be a complete lack of theories 
of celestial motion. Finally, if there are many counterfactual scenarios such 
15   There has been much discussion about contrastive explanations. See: B. van Fraassen, The 
Scientific Image (Oxford University Press 1980); P. Lipton, “Contrastive Explanations,” In 
Knowles (ed.), Explanation and its Limits (Cambridge University Press 1990) 247–266. 
In this formulation, I mainly follow James Woodward’s theory from Making Things 
Happen (Oxford University Press, 2003).
16   This is a normative view on the historiography of science. The suggestion is that the histo-
riography of science should, and sometimes does, provide such explanations. Moreover, 
much of existing historiography of science can be fruitfully read through such a concep-
tion of historiography of science. It is a philosophical view that goes beneath the surface 
of what historians actually say.
17   The example in the next section suggests how this can be done.
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that each of these scenarios would have led to F*, then the contingency of F 
depends on the scenario which is judged to be the most plausible one.
The claim that a feature F of the present science is contingent can (and 
must) be substantiated by (a) showing that the existence of the feature F* 
would have made the present science interestingly different, by (b) point-
ing out event Z that would have led to F*, and by (c) making sophisticated 
judgments about the plausibility or the far-fetchedness of the occurrence of Z 
(i.e. about the scenario where Z is the case). In this way, the framework here 
helps us understand how the degrees of contingency can be approached by 
using historical studies, as we will see in the next section.
The definition above requires that, in order to get discussions going, judg-
ments about the plausibility of historical scenarios involving Z can be made 
and that it can be assessed that Z would have led to F*. Nothing general about 
this topic can be said within the limits of this paper. However, in the next sec-
tion, I give an example of how historical study can be used to argue for certain 
degrees of contingency of certain features of science. This discussion points 
out that, even in the absence of a theory of how judgements about the plausi-
bility of counterfactual scenarios work, historians always make these kinds of 
judgments when explaining historical processes. Moreover, these judgments 
make sense and can be rationally debated. Of course, there might not exist a 
point where everyone agrees on a given set of counterfactuals.18 Nevertheless, 
we will see that the framework developed here can narrow down the topics of 
disagreement and highlight which disagreements are relevant with respect to 
a given topic. Moreover, there exists a comforting amount of analysis of the 
use of counterfactuals in history,19 and there exist, in the literature concerning 
the C–I debate, many studies that speak to the possibility of finding out points 
of history that have had an influence on the path that has led to the present 
situation in science.20
18   Moreover, if someone is not skeptical only about particular evaluations of historical 
counterfactuals but denies the possibility of historical counterfactual altogether, ques-
tions on contingency of science are not meaningful to this person. After all, descriptions 
of science “as it could have been” are descriptions of counterfactual science. Thus, global 
skepticism towards counterfactuals is not something that affects my framework alone.
19   On the use of counterfactuals in history, see: Alexander Maar, “Possible uses of counterfac-
tual thought experiments in history,” Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 
18:1 (2014), 87–113. Tim De Mey and Erik Weber, “Explanation and Thought Experiments in 
History,” History and Theory 42:1 (2003), 28–38. Johannes Bulhof, “What if? Modality and 
history,” History and Theory 38:2 (1999), 145–168 and Journal of the Philosophy of History 
10 (3).
20   See footnote 10.
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Before proceeding to the example, one thing needs to be taken into con-
sideration. The isolation of significant features is typically carried out in the 
following manner: we take features that are prima facie significant and then 
attempt to establish more general principles that make these features signifi-
cant. In a continuous process, we then compare the features and the princi-
ples in such a way that the judgments about the significance of some feature 
and the plausibility of our principles can both be adjusted. For example, we 
may say that the observation of gravitational deflection (see details below) is 
a significant feature of science since it plays an important part in the accep-
tance of relativistic physics (and thus in the overall shape of our physics) and 
in the understanding and technology that it provides. If these were different, 
we would have an interestingly different science. Arguably, the way we see the 
world and the technology we use impact our lives in a remarkable way. Now, 
if one accepts this, a sociologist might point out that, since the technological 
state of our society is one of the features that makes science significant, gender 
distribution in science is also a significant feature of science since it shapes the 
distribution and use of technology in a way that matters. If the distribution of 
technological resources were different, we would live in an interestingly dif-
ferent world. In contrast, if we used different symbols in the periodic table, 
science would not be interestingly different. Everything we know about chem-
istry and the applications of this knowledge would be the same. At least one 
could, if they disagreed, argue for the significance of the symbols themselves.
In this way, we can rationally evaluate which features of science are signifi-
cant.21 Once we know the significant features and why they are significant, we 
also know which alternatives to these are the interesting ones. What would be 
an interesting alternative to science depends on what we want from science, 
and what achievements of science (good or bad) we see as relevant. Ultimately, 
considerations such as these are based on our values. Deep questions of values 
cannot be discussed here. However, we have seen that it is possible to distin-
guish the interesting alternatives to science from the non-interesting ones.
21   Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond nicely illustrates the wide variety of features that might be taken 
to be significant: “Had the alternate approach been realized [in physics], there would be 
a number of significant differences: [among other things] pedagogical approaches to the 
theory would be different and certainly more convincing [and] the large cultural impact 
of relativity theory would have been quite different, from its many and often problematic 
philosophical exegeses […] to its vernacular manifestations, for instance in popular ico-
nography (Einstein’s tongue!).” (“On the Plurality of (Theoretical) Worlds,” Science as It 
Could Have Been, 341–342.).
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5 Eddington and the Gravitational Deflection
In “‘An Expedition to Heal the Wounds of War’: The 1919 Eclipse and Eddington 
as Quaker Adventurer,” (2003), Matthew Stanley describes the process that led 
to Eddington’s 1919 eclipse expedition and the observation of gravitational de-
flection. According to Stanley, the execution of this expedition was a pivotal 
event that had a notable effect on scientists’ acceptance of Einstein’s general 
theory of relativity.
I use Stanley’s article to demonstrate the framework formulated above. The 
main goal of this section is to show that the framework can help us use his-
torical studies to evaluate the degrees of contingency of particular features 
of science. I show that while we can have progress in these evaluations, we 
cannot settle the questions once and for all. I will make it explicit when fur-
ther historical research can settle an open question and when we are forced 
to use considerations that are more philosophical—and thus also potentially 
undecidable—in their nature.
Two things must be noted: first, for the sake of illustration, I assume that 
Stanley’s account is correct. I also make, to the same end, some claims that might 
seem controversial with the purpose of isolating interesting issues that are 
connected to contingency and inevitability. This illustration does not have the 
purpose of arguing for or against inevitabilism. It only aims to show how the 
issue can be approached by using existing historical research and how such 
research can fuel the discussion.
Stanley highlights the following aspects of the process leading to the 
expedition:
The eclipse’s scientific significance had gradually become clear over the 
course of the war years. The first mention of relativity’s prediction of the 
bending of light in the Observatory was an anonymous 1913 note entitled 
“Gravitation and Light.”22
[Eddington published] Report on the Relativity Theory of Gravitation, a 
small volume that was the first complete treatment of general relativity 
in English. Soon, enough interest in the theory had been generated to 
begin investigation into the logistics of an expedition to test it.23 [M]any 
astronomers thought the expedition would be a waste of time. The refu-
gee scientist, Jonckheere, warned that there were several different 
22   Stanley, “’An Expedition to Heal the Wounds of War’: The 1919 Eclipse and Eddington as 
Quaker Adventurer,” 71.
23   Ibid.
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mechanisms that might duplicate the predicted deflection, making ob-
servations useless. [Yet] such a vague objection, Lindemann said, should 
carry little weight compared to Einstein’s detailed and consistent 
theory.24
[Astronomer Royal] Frank Dyson felt that while the theory was 
speculative, its implications were so important that it needed to be 
investigated.25
Einstein’s theory predicted that a ray of light traveling near a massive 
object, such as the sun, would undergo a small but measurable deflection 
of its path. This was one of the three “classic” relativistic effects predicted 
by Einstein: the advance of the perihelion of Mercury was already estab-
lished, and the measurement of the redshift of the solar spectrum was 
proving difficult. This left observing the gravitational deflection as the 
only realistic hope of confirming general relativity.26
Passages such as these convey the impression that the British scientific commu-
nity was interested in making the observations purely for scientific reasons—
even the objections to the journey were based on scientific considerations. The 
expedition to an eclipse was thought to be the only way to test the theory, and 
there were scientific reasons to think that the expedition could bring useful 
results. Yet Stanley points out that “[d]iscussions such as these were impor-
tant in the scientific debate but had little impact on the actual planning of the 
expedition. This was chiefly in the hands of two astronomers who were also 
interested in ramifications beyond the scientific test: Eddington and Dyson.”27 
The execution of the expedition required the individual effort of Eddington 
and Dyson despite the fact that the Joint Permanent Eclipse Committee, a group 
set up by both the Royal Society and the Royal Astronomical Society to pool 
the intellectual and logistical resources of the two groups, already existed.
The question we must ask is why Eddington was so keen on the expedition. 
Stanley points to Eddington’s Quaker background and the context of the First 
World War. Stanley describes how the beginning of the war changed the at-
titude of British society, including scientists, toward the Germans. Despite an 
early declaration that science is above politics, the reality of war resulted in 
hatred toward the Germans, as Stanley points out in detail.28 In this context, 
24   Stanley, “An Expedition,” 72.
25   Ibid., 70–71.
26   Ibid., 71.
27   Ibid., 72.
28   Stanley, “An Expedition,” 59–67.
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it was Eddington’s Quaker background that shaped his attitude toward the 
situation:
Eddington’s reaction […] was largely shaped by his membership in British 
society’s traditional bastion of pacifism: the Society of Friends.29
The Friends’ goal was to demonstrate “the brotherhood of man over-
stepping all artificial barriers of race, politics or creed, which we believe 
to be the only true foundation upon which the family of nations can 
rest.”30
Those Friends who ventured to Europe to relieve this suffering, both 
during and after the war, worked in difficult and sometimes dangerous 
conditions. These relief workers came to be known as “adventurers,” and 
they hold a special place in Quaker history as men and women who jour-
neyed into far and foreign lands as a duty of conscience. The strategies 
used by these adventurers became the models for Eddington’s efforts 
to use the eclipse expedition as a tool in repairing international 
relationships.31
Given Stanley’s arguments, we can ask to what degree the observation of gravi-
tational deflection was a contingent matter. To use the framework formulated 
in the previous section, we must begin by defining the significant feature of 
science that resulted from Eddington’s expedition. Arguably, the answer is: the 
significant feature F in this case is that the observation of gravitational deflec-
tion has been made. A significant alternative (F*) to this feature F is that the 
observation has not been made.
Next we must ask the question (C):
What conditions should have been different so that the observation would 
not have been made?
We can begin our search for the answer by formulating the following ques-
tion and answer in order to find these conditions:
Q1. Why did Eddington execute the expedition rather than not?
E1. Because Eddington attempted to reunite the international scien-
tific community due to his Quaker background and because the expedi-
tion had the chance to produce scientifically interesting results due to 
the interest in Einstein’s theory.
29   Ibid., 61.
30   Ibid., 68.
31   Ibid., 67–68.
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One might think that Eddington’s execution of the expedition of 1919 is the 
condition that can be given as an answer to the question C, and thus answer-
ing the question Q1 provides the details of the answer. If this is the case, then 
F is a rather contingent feature of science: it depends on Eddington’s person-
al religious worldview, and it is easy to provide plausible scenarios in which 
Eddington did not have this worldview—he could have lost his faith in hu-
manity because of the war. However, the details given by E1 are not the answer 
to C. This is due to the fact that Q1 leaves it open as to whether or not someone 
else would have made the expedition if Eddington had not. Thus, we must con-
tinue our search for the answer to C.
Next we can ask:
Q2. Why did Eddington, rather than someone else, execute the expedition?
E2. Because Eddington was concerned about the unity of the interna-
tional scientific community and wanted to unify it due to his Quaker 
background, and no one else had this concern.32
It might be argued that once we know why Eddington, rather than someone 
else, executed the expedition, we can then evaluate how plausible it is that the 
expedition would have been executed without Eddington. But the contrast in 
Q2 is misleading if this was the evaluation we wanted. E2 tells us in which situ-
ation someone else would have executed the expedition instead of Eddington, 
but Q2 assumes that the expedition would have been carried out in either case. 
E2 in itself would become interesting only if an argument was given for the 
claim that the identity of the executor of the expedition had an impact on the 
making of the observations. The possibility of this must be settled by investi-
gating whether or not Eddington had a unique set of skills that were necessary 
in making the observations. This is a step in the right direction, but we must 
still continue our search for the answer to C.
We can ask:
Q3. Why was the observation attempted33 in 1919 rather than later?
E3. Because Eddington was concerned about unifying the internation-
al community and had the urge to work at a quick pace in this matter due 
32   Stanley’s description makes one think that Eddington played the pivotal role due to his 
unique concern in the context.
33   This innocent change of terms is due the fact that later an expedition itself may not have 
been necessary (it could have perhaps been made in a place where an observatory already 
existed, etc.).
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to his Quaker background (and because of lucky occurrences during the 
journey).
This is again a step in the right direction, because E3, unlike E1 and E2, speci-
fies the conditions in which the expedition (and thus the observations) would 
not have been made in 1919. It can be argued that the execution of the expedi-
tion in 1919 was a rather contingent event based on, again, the contingency of 
Eddington’s background. But once we notice that we defined the significant 
feature F to be that the observation of gravitational deflection has been made, 
and once we notice that almost one hundred years have passed since 1919, we 
see that the contrast in Q3 is not relevant to answering question C. This is due 
to the fact that the answer to Q3 says nothing about the years since 1919 and 
thus E3 does not tell us anything about how plausible it is that the observa-
tion would have been sought later in the twentieth or at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century.34 The correct question to ask is :
Q4. Why was the observation attempted rather than not?
E4. Because there was an increasing scientific interest in Einstein’s 
theory and because the observation of gravitational deflection was 
viewed as a practical way to test the theory.
We saw earlier how Stanley points to these factors. British scientists were 
planning the expedition even before Eddington and Dyson took the execution 
into their hands. Moreover, Stanley does not refer to or give any reason to be-
lieve that had Eddington not become involved when he did, the observation 
of deflection would not have been made at any point in history. This means 
that what seemed to make the feature F highly contingent, i.e. Eddington’s 
religious worldview, is no longer a condition that can be used to answer 
question C.
34   If we had formulated F in our illustration in another way, for example, saying that it is 
significant that the observation was made in 1919 and not later, then a highly contingent 
condition—Eddington’s Quaker background—would be the condition on which the sig-
nificant feature depends. F could be defined in this way if we wanted to know, for example, 
the degree of contingency of a certain other feature G, that has become part of science 
only recently and that is a result of developments that began in 1919 when Eddington 
made the observation of gravitational deflection. That science has the feature G, and not 
some alternative to it, would be judged to be highly contingent if it was necessary, in order 
to have G, that the expedition took place in 1919. The more recent the features of science 
in which we are interested, the more likely it is that they could have been otherwise.
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We can now explicate the philosophical lessons that can be drawn from the 
example. First, it must be noted that we did not analyze the contingency of 
having the observation of gravitational deflection in detail. The example only 
pointed out how it is possible to find the conditions on which having the sig-
nificant feature F instead of F*depends. We came to the conclusion (for the 
sake of illustration, of course) in Q4-E4 that only if there had been no scientific 
interest in Einstein’s theory, it could have been possible that the gravitational 
deflection would never have been observed. To evaluate the contingency of 
having the observation of gravitational deflection requires an investigation 
that evaluates the plausibility of scenarios in which there was no interest in 
Einstein’s theory. How plausible is the scenario where Einstein’s theory was not 
formulated? How plausible is the scenario where Einstein’s theory was ignored 
by the scientific community?
These questions cannot be answered based on Stanley’s paper. It is possible 
to get closer to the right answer through further historical studies. These stud-
ies could investigate the following questions:
1. How widespread was the idea of spacetime curvature among scientific 
communities?
2. How was the evidential value of such observations viewed in scientific 
communities?
3. How seriously did scientists plan to isolate German scientists, including 
Einstein, after the war?
4. What was the status of physics among the socio-political environment? 
Were the politicians planning to solely focus on the aspects of physics 
that would have direct impact on military technology?
Of course, no matter how much empirical information we have, questions of 
counterfactual paths of science cannot be unequivocally answered. Here we 
come to the point where different philosophical considerations and intuitions 
about science divide us on the issue of contingency. Can we, for example, as-
sume that the world has a determined structure? Is science an opportunistic 
field where very small changes in the social environment can direct scientists 
to pursue different activities? Do observations really matter in theory choice? 
This means that there is no guarantee that discussions on the contingency of a 
particular feature of science can be settled.
However, once we have identified crucial historical points on which our 
actual science presumably depends, we have also limited the number of 
philosophical considerations that are relevant to settling the questions of con-
tingency. For example, if we are able to show that the existence of Einstein’s 
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theory (and the scientific community’s interest in the theory) is the best can-
didate for the factor on which observations of gravitational deflection depend, 
then the considerations of the connections between observations and theo-
retical works play a role in the attempts to decide the contingency of those 
observations. On the other hand, if empirical research leads us to believe that 
Eddington’s religious background is the best candidate for the factor on which 
the observation of gravitational deflection depends, then the considerations 
of the connections between personal background and scientific work play a 
role in the attempts to decide the contingency of those observations. Thus, the 
framework formulated in the last section does not rid us of all disagreement 
in questions of contingency, but does help narrow down the relevant consid-
erations in a particular case. Thereby, the framework helps us find common 
ground between rival views.
There is one more lesson to be learned from the example. It must be noted 
that the difference between having the observation of gravitational deflection 
and not having that observation is interesting only in certain contexts of dis-
cussion, as the definition of contingency given in the previous section asserts. 
An example of this kind of context would be a discussion on the building of 
GPS navigation devices. One could wonder how these devices became so use-
ful, and someone could answer the question by pointing out that this is partly 
due to the fact that we have begun to understand the effects of gravitational 
deflection. If the observation of deflection had not been made, we might still 
have inaccuracies in these devices and they would not be as useful as they are. 
We would attempt to find the cause of the malfunction of the devices in places 
it does not exist. Thus, it is significant that our thinking is no longer limited by 
assumptions based on a Euclidean view of space. In this way, it becomes clear 
that there exists a hidden structure in our definition of significant feature F 
that is given by the context of discussion: F is that the observation of gravita-
tional deflection has been incorporated into our thinking and F*, the significant 
alternative, is that we do not use the concept of gravitational deflection in our 
thinking in the problem situation which we face in the modern world.
The last point is important since it counters the following argument:
Every feature of science is dependent on a previous event, and this event 
is again based on some previous event, and so on. Moreover, even if we 
ignore all the trivial factors that present science depends on (such as the 
existence of humankind), every event in the given chain is a contingent 
event and these contingencies add up to a highly contingent present 
situation. For example, the observation of gravitational deflection was 
dependent on the formulation of Einstein’s theory; the formulation of 
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Einstein’s theory was dependent on the physics of the nineteenth cen-
tury; the physics of the nineteenth century was dependent on the work 
of Newton; and so on. The chain could have broken at any point, and thus 
it is a great coincidence that we have observed gravitational deflection.
First, it must be noted that this kind of thinking is flawed. Causal chains in the 
world do not work in this neat manner. There are situations of overdetermina-
tion, pre-emption, non-transitive causal chains and overlapping causal chains 
that make this kind of argumentation simply naïve.35
Secondly, and more substantially, this argument can be overcome by simply 
pointing out that if Newtonian mechanics, for example, had never developed, 
then there would not be a theoretical framework against which the conse-
quences of not having evidence for gravitational deflection could arise. If we 
had not dealt with the actual questions of physics, then the thinking process 
that uses knowledge of gravitational deflection would not exist, nor would the 
thinking processes that take the absence of gravitational deflection as a seri-
ous possibility (a process like this would be the futile search for the causes 
of the malfunctioning of GPS navigation devices). In the absence of physics, 
lacking one piece of data would be the least of our concerns. To summarize, 
the counterfactual situations in which an alternative feature F* is assumed to 
be part of science must be somewhat close to our actual situation. Otherwise 
the differences between the features of our actual science and the interest-
ing alternatives to these would not be meaningful. As Rouse puts it: “Differing 
judgments about scientific significance thus matter well beyond whether they 
lead to differences in accepted truth claims. We need to ask which accepted 
beliefs matter to science, and how they matter.”36
To ask whether science could have been different is to ask whether or not 
it could have been different in an interesting way. Asking whether science 
could have been different in an interesting way is not the same thing as ask-
ing whether science today could have been fundamentally different or missing 
altogether. Only historical studies that show the degree of contingency of the 
35   James Woodward’s Making Things Happen is a good place to become familiar with these 
issues and the complexity of causal thinking and philosophy of causation. An example 
(not from Woodward): My soccer team’s losing to ManU depends on the goal they scored 
in the first minute. This depends on my team’s inability to stop the attack. However, had 
we been able to stop the attack earlier, ManU would still have scored a goal in the second 
minute (by understanding our defense better) and my team would have lost anyway.
36   Rouse, “Laws, Scientific Practice, and the Contingency/Inevitability Question,” 320.
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things that we find significant in science can increase our reflective under-
standing of this question.
6 Contingency, Counterfactuals and the Relevance of Historiography
 Historical Contingency: The Nature of Relevant Initial Conditions
The concepts of contingency and necessity are widely discussed in the philoso-
phy of history. One definition closely similar to the one presented in this paper 
is that of Yemima Ben-Menahem. According to Ben-Menahem, “contingency 
(necessity) varies in magnitude: the greater (smaller) the sensitivity to initial 
conditions, the greater the degree of contingency (necessity).”37 To reiterate:
Contingency: Similar causes lead to different types of effects. High sensi-
tivity to initial conditions.
Necessity: Different types of causes lead to similar effects. Low sensi-
tivity to initial conditions.38
However, there are remarkable differences between the definition of this 
paper and the definition of Ben-Menahem. First, my definition of contingency 
does not require that similar causes lead to different outcomes.39 The factor 
Z that would have led to F* does not need to be similar to Y in order for there 
to be contingency. All that is needed is that Z is not far-fetched.40 Secondly, 
even if different types of causes lead to similar effects, this does not mean that 
science is inevitable. In my framework, this similarity of effects can still mean 
that there are some interesting differences between them, and thus there can 
exist contingency. Similarly, even if the effects are very different, this does not 
automatically mean that one is an interesting alternative to the other. A great 
advantage of my framework is that it makes explicit what differences and simi-
larities we are interested in. We do not need to find out the general proper-
ties of the causal structures in history to gain knowledge of the contingency of 
37   Yemima Ben-Menahem, “Historical contingency,” Ratio 10:2 (1997), 102.
38   Ibid., 101.
39   Notice that also Soler’s definition (section 2) mentions more or less the same initial 
conditions.
40   There does not seem to be any reason to equate similarity and non-far-fetchedness. 
Pulling the trigger of a gun and merely holding a finger on the trigger are very similar 
events. Yet the pulling of the trigger can be a far-fetched alternative in a situation where 
an experienced and trustworthy police officer holds their finger on the trigger.
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features we are interested in. We can focus on the structures and features we 
are interested in.
 Reconsidering Counterfactual History
It is important to make note of how the contrastive explanations based on 
counterfactuals differ from what is known as study of counterfactual histo-
ries. In these studies, an event C is assumed to be the cause of an event E and 
the question one tries to answer is: What would have happened had C not 
occurred,41 or more generally, what could have happened had certain things 
been different in the past? On the other hand, the formulation of a contras-
tive explanation begins by specifying the relevant alternatives to the event E 
and proceeds to find out which alternatives (C*) of C would have led to some 
relevant alternative (E*) to E. Although studies of counterfactual histories can 
achieve the conclusion that science would be interestingly different had cer-
tain things been different, this is not guaranteed. The reasoning could also lead 
to the conclusion that science would be different, but not interestingly so, or to 
the conclusion that science would not be different.
This means that my framework offers an energy-efficient way of approach-
ing questions of contingency. When we first specify what differences we are 
interested in and then proceed backwards in history to the causes of these dif-
ferences (rather than forwards, as in the study of counterfactual history), we 
are able to bypass a variety of considerations that do not have direct relevance 
to understanding the contingency of science in particular cases.
 The Value of Existing Historiography in a Philosophical Debate
The C–I debate has produced and highlighted many excellent historical studies 
that are relevant to the issue of contingency.42 The debate has shown that good 
historical work is extremely useful in approaching the issue of the contingency 
of science. Nevertheless, once we are interested in generalizing the questions 
on the contingency of science to a vast range of issues that historians of science 
are interested in, a general framework that tells us how we can approach ques-
tions of contingency needs to be in place. There are two reasons for this. First, 
historians of science have produced high quality works. It is advantageous to 
have a framework that can be used to extract relevant points from these works; 
there is no need to wait for studies that directly intend to discuss the degree 
of contingency of a particular feature of science. Secondly, the framework can 
work as a tool in the historical research that discusses such questions. Due to 
41   Maar, “Possible uses of counterfactual thought experiments in history,” 88.
42   See examples in footnote 10.
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its complete generality, it can unify the structures of such studies. We also saw 
above that my framework is energy efficient. Moreover, since historical case 
studies in the philosophy of science face difficult methodological issues,43 the 
possibility of using historical studies that are made independently of the issue 
of contingency is an advantage.44
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I formulated a framework that helps us discuss the degree of 
contingency of any feature of science that a historian of science might be in-
terested in. While this framework does not give a perfect algorithm to solve 
questions of contingency, it nevertheless tells us what types of questions to 
ask and what to consider when approaching questions of contingency. The 
framework also shows the place of our evaluations of significance in questions 
of contingency. Some alternatives to science are more interesting than others, 
and we should focus on those interesting alternatives. Furthermore, the frame-
work shows how already existing historical studies can provide insights into 
questions of contingency. Although the framework is a very general one, it is 
humble in one important sense: we can only approach the contingency of sci-
ence in a piecemeal manner, asking whether this or that particular feature of 
science could be interestingly different.
43   See Katherina Kinzel, “Narrative and evidence. How can case studies from the history of 
science support claims in the philosophy of science?” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science Part A 49 (2015), 48–57; and Joseph C. Pitt, “The Dilemma of Case Studies: Toward 
a Heraclitian Philosophy of Science,” Perspectives on Science 9:4, 373–382.
44   Of course, there does not exist a perfectly objective historical study, and historical re-
search can benefit from the discussions on contingency and inevitability, as Soler ar-
gues in “Introduction. The Contingentist/Inevitabilist Debate: Current State of Play, 
Paradigmatic Forms of Problems and Arguments, Connections to More Familiar 
Philosophical Themes,” Science as It Could Have Been, 22–23, and as is argued in this paper. 
However, it is still useful to be able to use historical studies that are made independently 
of the debate. They are probably the most objective ground that we may wish to have.
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